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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs and appellants respectfully petition this 
Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter based on the 
fact that there were certain points of fact and law that were 
apparently overlooked or misaoprehendedf and that the existence 
of a remedy in Utah based on the facts of this case needs to be 
established. 
POINTS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires this Petition to "state with particularity the points of 
law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked 
or misapprehended," These points are as follows: 
1. Facts were described at every stage of this 
litigation which showed oppressive conduct against the plaintiffs 
and those similarly situated. Likewise/ the existence of 
statutory and common law remedies have been brought before the 
courts. These facts were not enumerated and this law was not 
addressed in the decision of this Court. 
2. The Opinion of this Court states that appellants do 
not point to an attempt in these proceeding to pierce IIC's 
corporate veil. Facts were described and legal precedence urged 
before the trial court and on appeal justifying a disregarding of 
the separate identity of IIC and Equitable for purposes of 
identifying wrongful acts and granting an appropriate remedy. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE DEFENDANTS ARE UNLAWFULLY OPPRESSING THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Acts of oppression 
The following facts were presented before the trial 
court in the form of pleadings or otherwise, and must be viewed 
as correct: 
1. Pond was issued her 500 shares of IIC preferred 
stock after the death of her husband, Stillman H. Pond, upon the 
cancellation of the certificates that had been issued to him when 
he purchased them during their marriage in the early 1940's. ROA 
at 3. 
2. The Ross family owned the controlling stock 
beginning with Rod and Earl's grandfather. Rod Depo at 5-7. 
3. Pond owned 132 shares of Equitable common stock. 
She checked with several brokers, found no market quotation on 
the stock, and therefore sold all that she had of Equitable 
common stock to Ray R. Ross on November 1, 1974 for $1.25 per 
share. ROA at 7-8. 
4. In the early 1980fs, only members of the Ross family 
would purchase Equitable or IIC preferred stock, and then only 
for less than $5 per share. Deposition of Rod taken June 10, 
1991 - ROA at 759, 549 (Rod Depo) at 120-21. Deposition of Earl 
taken June 11, 1991 - ROA at 760, 549 (Earl Depo) at 67-71. 
5. As of October 31, 1986, the Ross family owned or 
controlled all or nearly all of the voting common stock of IIC 
and about 70% of the IIC preferred stock. ROA at 475-78. 
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6. A threat to Earl and Rod's control of Equitable was 
eliminated by Equitablefs secret purchase of all of the IIC 
common and preferred stock and Equitable stock held directly or 
indirectly by defendants Galen Ross, Connie Ross, David Ross and 
Betsy Ross Rapps, the members of the Ross family who had been 
pushed from a position of control. ROA at 437, 476-78. 
7. The 1988 Annual Statement reported that in the 
purchase of its own stock pursuant to the 1986 offer, and in the 
purchase from "a coalition," Equitable paid a total consideration 
of $6,809,596 for the equivalent of 300,609 of its own shares, or 
an average of $22.65 per share. As part of this purchase, 
Equitable bought over 40% (based on liquidation rights) of the 
outstanding IIC stock. Rod Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page. 
8. That same 1988 Annual Statement reported that each 
share it held of IIC stock, both common and preferred, was 
equivalent to 3.717 shares of its own stock "(based on 
liquidation rights)." Ld. Thus those same liquidation rights 
would result in an average value of over $84 per share of IIC 
stock, common or preferred. 
9. When equitable made that secret purchase of stock, 
including IIC preferred stock, from the said "coalition" of 
insiders, it made no comparable offer to purchase the IIC 
preferred stock held by the plaintiff class, which would have 
meant an additional investment of less than $1,730,000. ROA at 
11, 43. 
10. Equitable has been in a financial position such 
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that making this additional investment on a comparable basis 
would have posed "no difficulty whatsoever." Rod Depo at 122. 
11. When plaintiffs requested information pertaining to 
the foregoing transaction, they were forced to obtain an Order 
Compelling Production. ROA at 221, 275. 
12. Dividends have been declared or paid by IIC in only 
a very few years since the issuance of the preferred stock 
therein, and then only at the minimum rate, 6% of the SI par 
value. IIC has indicated that dividends have been paid to the 
preferred shareholders of IIC on four occasions, namely, in 1954, 
1981, 1983 and 1984, and seven times total. ROA 211-12, 500. 
13. This policy pertaining to dividends has continued 
since the dismissal by the trial court, as shown in the attached 
document described in oral argument. 
14. IIC does not have current information on the 
addresses of dozens of minority shareholders. ROA at 585. 
15. Equitable is paying members of the Ross family 
unjustifiably high amounts in salary and benefits. ROA at 545. 
16. Each director of Equitable receives an annual 
compensation for being a director of at least $10,000. Earl Depo 
at 22. The total earnings of Earl and Rod have not been 
disclosed, in accordance with their attorneyfs direction. Earl 
Depo at 4. Earl's sisters all work for Equitable and receive 
additional annual compensation of about $75,000. Earl Depo at 
23. 
The foregoing facts show a clear pattern of oppressive 
5 
conduct. 
The most egregious element appears to be the lack of 
dividends. As indicated from the foregoing, in the last 50 years 
the plaintiffs have had less than a 50% return of capital, or an 
average of return on investment of less than 1% per year. An 
investor surely would have a reasonable expectation of a greater 
return if the company he invests in succeeds. 
Obviously, the company has succeeded, as evidenced by 
the book value for each lie preferred share of over $84. The 
common shares of IIC have the same book value, and they were 
given a dividend 75.83 times as great: $4.55, or 6% of $75.83. 
Discovery may have shown like disparities in prior dividends. 
Likewise, with or without the amendment to the 
Complaint, but with discovery on the salaries of Rod and Earl, it 
is likely that the facts would show these to have been used as a 
means of draining off profits without sharing with the minority 
shareholders. This would also be a cause of action on the part 
of the company, but is more important and more easily proven as 
an element of oppressive conduct. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975). 
Summarizing other pertinent applicable facts, there are 
unsophisticated investors, members of the general public, who buy 
an investment in a company or tier of companies controlled by one 
family. There are no books to speak of in the specific company 
in which stock is purchased. When records are sought, they are 
denied. There are no meetings nor are the investors otherwise 
6 
kept informed; in factf there are agreements to keep them 
uninformed. There is no market for the shares, except for the 
members of the controlling family who are only willing to buy at 
the stock at a small fraction of its liquidation value, the value 
attributed to it in books supplied to the Insurance- Commission. 
Examples of oppression in case law 
Generally, oppressive conduct involves a pattern of 
activities which are markedly unfair, violate the fiduciary 
responsibility of the majority shareholders, or thwart the 
reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders: 
Oppressive conduct suggests "burdensome, harsh 
and wrongful conduct, a lack of probity and 
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the 
prejudice of some of its members, or a visible 
departure from the standards of fair dealings 
and a violation of fair play on which every 
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company 
is entitled to rely." Whale Art Co., 
Inc. v_^  Doctor, 743 S.W.2d 511, 514 
(Mo. App. 1987). 
Thus, we conclude that our cases involving the 
fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders, 
officers and directors of a corporation embrace 
the same standard which other courts have 
evolved under the term "oppressive conduct." 
Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 
(W.Va. 1980). 
The [New York] court stated that "oppression 
should be deemed to arise only when the 
majority conduct substantially defeats 
expectations that, objectively viewed, were 
both reasonable under the circumstances and 
were central to the petitioner's decision to 
join the venture," .... Balvik v. Sylvester, 
411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987). 
The foregoing are the general definitions and 
descriptions given to oppressive conduct. The following are 
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specif ic examples. 
The case of Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co,f 645 P.2d 929 
(Mont. 1982) reviewed these definitions and applied them to show 
oppression where dividends had not been declared: 
It can be said here that the corporations 
are in a position to declare dividends, that 
the refusal to do so acts as a hardship on 
Melvin, and when considered in light of all 
other circumstances, that such refusal 
strengthens Melvin's argument that he is being 
squeezed. This is a case where the cumulative 
effects of many acts and incidents constitute 
sufficient evidence of oppressive conduct to 
compel liquidation without a showing of 
inevitable ruin. I_d. at 934. 
The case of Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 
1985) found oppressive conduct where no notice was given of 
meetings, the directors received very high salaries, the minority 
shareholder had a difficult time obtaining records, and there was 
an unfairly low offer to buy the stock. 
In McCauley v. Tom McCauley _& Sons, Inc. , 724 P. 2d 232 
(N.M. App. 1986), the minority shareholder had no office, no 
benefits, no dividends, restrictions on transfer, essentially 
being held hostage and frozen out. Also in Masinter, supra, the 
court found there were no dividends and the minority shareholders 
were being frozen out without any business purpose. 
Balvik, supra, upheld the trial court in a finding of 
fact of oppressive conduct where the shareholder had no 
employment and no office, which was contrary to the reasonable 
expectation. 
In Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609 
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(Mo. App. 1990), on the other hand, no oppressive conduct was 
found. There was a mere business decision, made by independent 
directors, that some, and only some, stockholders should be 
bought out. Where there was oppression, such as in the case of 
Whale Art Co., supra, where the minority shareholder did not get 
a bonus and was thus cut out of the profits, Missouri law 
provided a remedy. 
The court in Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st 
Cir. 1986) found that the defendants had taken actions designed 
to freeze the minority shareholders out of the financial benefits 
they would ordinarily have received. There was uneven salary and 
benefits, and eventually no employment. There were no dividends. 
The capstone of the plan of the majority was the offer to buy the 
stock at a grossly inadequate price, $3.33 instead of $16.30 per 
share. 
2. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A REMEDY. 
Utah Courts not fettered 
In the realm of sovereign immunity, the courts in Utah 
have found themselves powerless to to fully exercise their 
conscience. "(T)he immunity from suit imposed by the legislature 
may seem unconsionably broad." Malcolm v. State of Utah, 235 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (1994). However, in this realm, concerning 
the oppression of minority shareholders, the Court need not 
ignore unconscionable results. 
In fact, the legislature has encouraged, rather than 
discouraged, the courts in Utah to protect minority shareholders. 
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It has enacted and re-enacted an appropriate remedial statute. 
Before 1992, subsection 16-10-92(a)(2) gave district 
courts the power to liquidate the assets and business of a 
corporation in an action by a shareholder when it was established 
that the acts of the directors or those in control of the 
corporation were oppressive. 
Beginning in 1992, subsection 16-10a-1430(2)(b) orovided 
that a corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by a 
shareholder if it is established that the directors or those in 
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in 
a manner that is oppressive. 
Clearly, neither statute requires a derivative action. 
The proceeding is one of a shareholder against the corporation to 
enforce the rights of that shareholder. 
This is the same in other states. Most of the cases 
cited regarding oppressive conduct, including the freezing out of 
a shareholder, had no derivative aspect. The one or two that had 
such an aspect did not need it. 
Numerous remedies available 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the 
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
The court in Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 
264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973) stated that courts are not 
limited to the remedy of dissolution. It then listed several 
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appropriate alternative remedies, including (a) dissolution on a 
specific future date in the event the stockholders fail to 
resolve their differencesf (b) the appointment of a receiver to 
continue the operation of the business for the benefit of all of 
the stockholders until differences are resolved or oppressive 
conduct ceasesf (c) the appointment of an agent to report to the 
court regarding the continued operation of the company with the 
court retaining jurisdiction, (d) the retention of jurisdiction 
of the court for the protection of minority shareholders without 
the appointment of an agent, (e) the ordering of an accounting 
for funds alleged to have been misappropriated, (f) the issuance 
of an injunction to prohibit continuing acts of oppressive 
conduct, which may include the reduction of salaries or bonus 
payments found to be unjustified or excessive, (g) the ordering 
of affirmative relief by the required declaration of a dividend 
or a reduction and distribution of capital, (h) the ordering of 
affirmative relief by the entry of an order requiring the 
corporation or a majority of its stockholders to purchase the 
stock of the minority stockholders at a price to be determined by 
a formula or by the court, (i) an order permitting minority 
shareholders to purchase additional stock under conditions 
specified by the court, and (j) an award of damages to minority 
stockholders as compensation for injuries suffered by them by 
reason of such oppressive conduct by the majority in control. 
In Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903 (Or. App. 1989) the 
defendants were required to buy the plaintiffs1 interests in the 
11 
related companies, without any discount to reflect their minority 
status. The court in McCauley, supra, gave the defendants their 
choice of three options: (1) liquidation of the corporation; (2) 
partition and reorganization; or (3) purchase by the corporation 
of plaintiff's outstanding shares. 
In Davis v^ Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988) the 
trial court had ordered a combination of a buy-out, a receiver, 
an injunction, damages, costs, attorney's fees, a trust, 
dissolution, and reformation of deeds. In generally uoholding 
the trial court, the decision cited cases from Alaska, Iowa, New 
Mexico, New York, and Oregon which allowed a buy-out as a less 
harsh remedy for oppressive acts than the liquidation provided 
for in their respective statutes. It also mentioned that 
statutes in Connecticut, Minnesota, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, California, and West Virginia specify a buy-out as a 
remedy or as an option available to majority shareholders. 
Stefano, supra, was another Alaska case where a buy-out 
was ordered at a specific price, that being an equitable remedy 
less drastic than dissolution. 
Whale Art Co., supra, ordered a $10,000 bonus to be paid 
as the appropriate remedy. 
In Fox, supra, the court recited a statute like Utah's. 
It then cited a publication on oppression of minority 
shareholders regarding dividend withholding being a squeezeout 
technique used in corporations of all sizes, but especially where 
control is concentrated in one family. Dissolution was found to 
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be an appropriate remedy. 
Similar remedies have been upheld for oppressive conduct 
in the absence of statute. Donahue, supra, required a buy-out. 
Suqarman, supra, gave tort remedies and required the wrongfully 
withheld money to be paid with interest. 
3. RES JUDICATA AND LAYERED CORPORATIONS MUST NOT EXCUSE 
OPPRESSIVE ACTS. 
Duty of defendants 
The defendants who are majority shareholders, directors 
and officers of IIC have a duty to ALL of the shareholders of 
IIC, not just to those in the position of control and their 
relatives. 
However, they have used this control to go years without 
dividends, and then have declared grossly disproportionate 
dividends, without any business justification. On what basis can 
they rightfully claim they deserve a return on their investment 
over 75 times as great? 
They claim a business purpose for Equitable's buying all 
of the IIC stock, common and preferred, at liquidation value from 
the dissenting members of the Ross family, and reporting it as 
such on their books. But they ignore the fact that they could 
easily have likewise offered to buy all of the IIC stock held by 
investors outside the Ross family. Obviously they know if they 
wait long enough, that can get it at the much, much lower price 
they customarily pay the minority stockholders for such stock. 
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Business form 
The courts have generally ignored the restraints of the 
corporate form to fashion a remedy for oppressive conduct against 
the minority shareholders. The case of Donahuef supra, drew from 
the responsibility of partners to each other to order a buy-out. 
The case of Chiles/ supra, ordered lessees and others to buy out 
the minority interest in six related lessors. 
It is not surprising that the corporate form can be 
disregarded in light of the remedy of dissolution. 
In the instant matter, the defendants that are majority 
shareholders, directors, and officers of IIC have oppressed the 
minority shareholders of IIC. Using that control of IIC to in 
turn control Equitable, they have also historically oppressed the 
minority shareholders of that company, implementing a freeze-out 
scheme that has in many cases, including Pond's, culminated with 
the purchase of Equitable common stock at a small fraction of its 
true value. 
Thus the court has power, with a finding of this 
oppressive conduct, to order the dissolution of IIC and of 
Equitable. A less harsh remedy may be more appropriate. But 
that power means that a remedy for oppressive conduct is not 
barred by reason of the corporate veil. 
Effect of the decision 
Because of the principle of res judicata, the opinion 
issued in this case will bar plaintiffs from ANY remedy. The 
events which have taken place cannot form the basis of another 
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lawsuit. As it states in the case of Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 
P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981): 
When a second claim, demand or cause of action 
is essentially the same as a prior claim, 
demand or cause of action which has gone to 
final judgment, res judicata means that neither 
of the parties can "again litigate that claim, 
demand or cause of action or any issue, point 
or part thereof which he could have but failed 
to litigate in the former action." Wheadon v. 
Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 46, 376 P.2d 946, 947 
(1962). The cited authority applied that 
principle against a plaintiff who lost on one 
theory and then brought an action on another 
one. 
The same principle is stated in Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch 
Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983), Cox v. Cedar City Corp., 
664 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983), Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 
845 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1992) (where there are four reasons 
listed for the principle), and Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990). 
The only exception to the application to this principle 
would be if this Court specifically ruled that the motion to 
allow the Amended Complaint could not have been denied on the 
basis that it failed to state a cause of action, and that the 
decision of this Court did not have res judicata effect with 
respect to the claims in that Amended Complaint. 
In addition, ten other holders of IIC preferred stock 
have sued the defendants based on their wrongful acts, since they 
were denied the right to intervene in this case. That new action 
has been temporarily stayed pending the decision on appeal, since 
so many issues are questions of law. Most, if not all, of the 
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causes of action in that case would be dismissed on the basis of 
the opinion issued. 
Furthermore, the defendants will receive the message 
that what they have done is not wrong, that they have been fully 
justified in all of their actions. 
The stare decisis effect will encourage any promoter 
checking on the facts of this case to feel free to structure 
investment schemes in like manner, making sure to only approach 
Utah investors in Utah. They need only put off investors 
regarding dividends for the first few years, until the statute of 
limitation has passed on Utah securities laws. Then even if they 
have phenomenal success, they need only give their investors a 
50% return of capital in 50 years. If such a procedure is not 
acceptable in Utah, it must be demonstrated in this case. 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
I, Lynn P. Heward, as one of the undersigned counsel for 
plaintiffs, hereby certify that this Petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
I appreciate the efforts of this Court in deciding this 
case. I apologize for not using the time of this Court at the 
initial hearing in such a way so as to avoid the need for a 
rehearing. 
DATED this 2 & ~ day of / y ^ ^  , 1994. 
LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
by ~*£^~-^&i-^J 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Petition were mailed with postage attached thereon to P. Bruce 
Badger, 215 South State Street #1200, P.O. Box 510210, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84151 on this 2 6 - day of XjU^ / , 1994. 
Insurance Investment Company 
P.O. Box 2460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
February 8,1994 
Dear Shareholder: 
Good News! 
The Board of Directors of Insurance Investment Company is pleased to announce the payment 
of a dividend declared for fiscal year 1993. 
Not only is this dividend the first in nearly 10 years (the first since 1984), but it is by far the 
largest in the Corporation's history! 
In accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, the dividend is to be paid as follows: 
Common Shares: $4.55 per share 
Preferred Shares (the maximum allowed): $0.06 per share 
The Articles of Incorporation state in Article 7: 
A. The holders of Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive preferential 
dividends in each fiscal year in the amount of six per cent before any 
dividends shall be paid upon any other stock of this corporation as and when 
declared by the Board of Directors of the corporation, but such dividends shall 
be noncumulative. 
E. After the payment of dividends upon the Preferred Stock then issued 
and outstanding or after a sum sufficient for the payment thereof has been set 
aside for such purpose from the surplus or net profits of this corporation, all of 
the remainder of said surplus or net profits shall become applicable to the 
payment of dividends on Common Stock Class ttAn then issued and 
outstanding, if, when and as declared by the Board of Directors of this 
corporation. 
We are pleased to enclose your appropriate amount ($4.55 per Common Share and $0.06 per 
Preferred Share). The dividend was declared in 1993, leaving open the possibility of a 1994 
dividend; however, inasmuch as the actual payment of the dividend did not occur until 1994, you 
should consider it 1994 income. You will receive a 1099 DIV Form fiom Insurance Investment 
about this time next year. 
Should you have any questions regarding your dividend, stock or Insurance Investment, please 
do not hesitate to call Mr. E. Rod Ross, Corporate Secretary, or myself at 1-800-352-5150, 579-
3400 locally. 
Very truly yours, 
R. Earl Ross 
President 
